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This research note selects out those people who admit to entering into a spirit of game
playing with tax law and compares them on a range of variables with those who do
not identify with this posture. Game playing is a posture that people adopt toward the
tax office that signals a lack of deference to the authority, although there may still be
respect for being law-abiding in the technical sense (Braithwaite, 2003).  Game
playing is an attitude that individuals acknowledge having.  As such it is slightly
different from the game playing behaviour that McBarnet observes among those
people who use loopholes in the law to avoid tax (McBarnet and Whelan, 1999).  The
point being made here is that attitude and behaviour are conceptually distinct:  After
all, we might like to do many things that we don’t have the money to actually do.  In
this particular instance, however, having a game playing attitude and engaging in
game playing behaviour are shown to be significantly related.  A lot of people seem
able to do what they would like to do.  (This is not so in other areas of taxation
compliance: see Braithwaite, 2003).
The attitude of game playing is measured through combining responses to the
following items: “like to find the grey area of the tax law,” “give the tax office a run
for their money,” “enjoy spending time working out how changes in the tax system
will affect them,” “enjoy talking to friends about loopholes in the tax system,” and
“enjoy minimising the tax they have to pay.”  Respondents indicated how much they
were like this using a 1-5 rating scale for each item.  Average scores were then
calculated across items.  If a respondent scored above the midpoint in the year 2000
(CHFAS) or  2002 (ATSFS), that person was coded as “game playing.” If not they
were coded in the “never” category.
CTSI Sample
Two consecutive surveys were conducted: the ‘Community Hopes, Fears and
Actions’ survey in 2000 (CHFAS), and the follow-up ‘The Australian Tax System:
Fair or not?' survey in 2002 (ATSFS).  The sample for this research note on game
playing comprised respondents who answered both surveys – CHFAS in 2000 and
ATSFS in 2002. The sample size was 1161 of whom:
ℵ 84 % were not game-playing at either time – 2000 or 2002
ℵ 16% were game-playing at one time or the other or at both times
The two groups were compared on a range of social demographic, attitudinal and
behavioural variables to find out how those who are engaged in game playing were
different from the majority of taxpayers.
Behavioural measures of evasion and avoidance
From Table 1, a consistent pattern emerges of game playing being more prevalent
among those who evade tax through over-claiming deductions, not declaring income
and using tax minimization schemes (see Braithwaite, 2003 for measures).  Business
owners are no more likely to display this posture than wage and salary earners. Thus,
across work groups, we find evidence that those who express the game playing
posture are more likely to take actions that reduce their tax contribution and they are
not averse to illegal means of doing so.
Table 1     Percentages and significant differences on the behavioural measures of
evasion and avoidance for the game playing group and the never group
Group
Tax evasion and
avoidance
Category Game
playing
N = 158
Never
N = 849
Chi-
Square
Tax deductions in
2000
Legitimate
deductions
Exaggerated
deductions
14%
24%
86%
76%
9.73*
Tax deductions in
2002
Legitimate
deductions
Exaggerated
deductions
14%
23%
86%
77%
8.03*
Declaring income
in 2000
Declared all
income
Did not declare all
income
13%
30%
87%
70%
18.03**
Declaring income
in 2002
Declared all
income
Did not declare all
income
13%
32%
87%
68%
21.60**
Tax minimization
in 2000
No tax min effort
Yes tax min effort
11%
20%
89%
80%
12.49**
Tax minimization
in 2002
No tax min effort
Yes tax min effort
10%
23%
90%
77%
30.93**
*  p < .01   **  p < .001
Other defiant postures
Game playing has been regarded as one defiant posture; disengagement and resistance
are the others (Braithwaite, 2003).  Interestingly, game players score significantly
higher on both resistance (an in-system posture) and disengagement (an out-of-system
posture) in Table 2.  This may mean that some of those who game play (those who are
also high on resistance) have not dismissed the tax authority altogether.  In such cases,
the tax authority may have the capacity to turn some of them around and rebuild
respect for the system.  Just as resistance can be read as a sign of hope for
reintegration, disengagement can be read as a sign of intransigence.  Further work of
the kind recommended by Wenzel and Taylor (2004) is needed to find out when
reintegration is practicable and when it is not.
Table 2     Mean scores and significant differences on the postures of
resistance and disengagement for the game playing group and the never group
Group
Motivational postures Game
playing
N = 158
Never
N = 849
t-value
Resistance 2000 3.33 3.12 4.44**
Resistance 2002 3.30 3.11 4.03**
Disengagement 2000 2.47 2.24 4.54**
Disengagement 2002 2.50 2.22 5.65**
*  p < .01   **  p < .001
External and internal regulation
Perceptions of deterrence have traditionally been measured through asking
respondents the likelihood of getting caught, the likelihood of sanctions being
imposed, and the seriousness of the consequences of the sanctions.  A multiplicative
term combines these measures and is used to represent the degree to which people
perceive a deterrence effect operating in the regulatory situation.
In Table 3, deterrence is less likely to be acknowledged by game players than
by those not adopting this posture.  Furthermore, when individuals are given
hypothetical scenarios in which they are asked to imagine themselves being caught for
evasion, game players are more likely than others to blame it on the tax office and
direct their anger accordingly.  Pride in being an honest taxpayer was substantially
lower for game players than it was for others.
These findings show game players to be distant from both the internal (eg
conscience) and external (eg sanctions) regulatory mechanisms that the tax authority
uses to bring taxpayers under control.  Thus, we might conceive of game playing as a
posture that allows individuals to escape from regulatory control.
Table 3     Mean scores and significant differences on the external and internal
regulation variables for the game playing group and the never group
Group
Taxpayer’s regulatory
experiences
Game
playing
N = 158
Never
N = 849
t-value
Perceived deterrence 2000 3.33 3.52 -2.60*
Perceived deterrence 2002 3.35 3.56 -2.93*
Shame displacement
2000
2.10 1.79 4.96**
Shame displacement
2002
2.09 1.85 4.25*
Pride in being an honest
taxpayer 2000
3.42 3.65 -3.94**
Pride in being an honest
taxpayer 2002
3.43 3.65 -3.71**
*  p < .01   **  p < .001
An alternative authority?
Those who wish to defy authority need a degree of courage, hot-headedness, or
strategic help, or all of these.  Hot-headedness is best captured in this research note by
the relative absence of fear and timidity, specifically, fear of deterrence is lower for
game players and shame displacement or anger directed at the tax office is higher.
In this section we move on to the idea of winning against the tax office
through strategic help.  Respondents were asked to tell us about their “ideal” tax
practitioner (“what qualities would you look for if you had to find a new advisor
today?”) and they were asked to describe the practitioner that they are now using.
Consistently, those in the game playing group wanted to risk having more
aggressive advice, they wanted an effective tax minimizer, and they were much more
likely to report having someone who met their needs.
Game playing is not an activity in which people engage by themselves.  The
items of the scale refer to the company of others.  These findings show that the others
are not just friends and acquaintances – they include highly skilled professionals who
act as intermediaries with the tax office.
Table 4 Mean scores and significant differences on the alternative authority
variables for the game playing group and the never group
Group
Alternative authority Game
playing
N = 158
Never
N = 849
t-value
Has an effective tax
minimizer or agent 2000a
3.15 2.72 6.49**
Has an effective tax
minimizer or agent 2002a
3.05 2.61 6.07**
Would like an effective tax
minimizer or agent 2000
2.57 2.24 4.89**
Would like an effective tax
minimizer or agent 2002
2.57 2.14 6.42**
Would like an aggressive tax
planning approach 2000
2.59 2.11 7.16**
Would like an aggressive tax
planning approach 2002
2.43 1.99 5.94**
*  p < .01   **  p < .001
a  The Ns are lower for these groups because some do not use a tax agent
The authority and its legitimacy
Those who have a game playing attitude display an unusual pattern of beliefs
regarding the ATO and its legitimacy as an authority (see Table 5).  On the one hand,
game players believe that they should obey the law – this is not inconsistent with their
posture since their raison d’etre is to find their way around the intent of the law while
being technically compliant.  At the same time, they seem to see the authority as weak
and as being unable or unwilling to deal with non-compliance issues when they arise.
Game players don’t believe that the tax authority uses the power it has at its disposal
in eliciting compliance from non-compliant taxpayers.  This observation explains why
game players see the ATO as treating all taxpayers as trustworthy.  The message here
is that game players see the tax office as falling asleep at the wheel.  Instead of being
firm and fair, the tax office is weak and disinterested, allowing ordinary taxpayers to
do what they want.
Table 5 Mean scores and significant differences on facets of legitimacy for the
game playing group and the never group
Group
Facets of legitimacy Game
playing
N = 158
Never
N = 849
t-value
Belief that the ATO uses its
power against ordinary
taxpayers
3.87 4.14 -3.76**
Belief in obeying the law 2.91 2.64 3.74**
Perception of being treated as
trustworthy
3.23 3.04 2.84*
*  p < .01   **  p < .001
Social values and world views
If game players are opportunists, evaluating the situation as one that can be exploited,
the solution should be quite easy – catch people and game playing should stop.  This
li f i bl S i l i f h W l d T l
(2004) kind could provide the evidence required to justify a substantial investment of
resources in this initiative.  Or such an evaluation might advise against it.  Why
ambiguity over the outcome?  Game players have quite a distinctive view of the world
as we see in Table 6 below.  These views suggest that game players might be like
those people in Brehm and Brehm’s (1981) research who reacted against deterrence
through persisting in their non-compliance. Even becoming more non-compliant.
From Table 6, game players see the world through a more competitive lens
than most others.  They believe in competition, they want to be wealthy and
successful, they value efficiency in individuals and in bureaucracy, and they want to
limit the intrusion of government into private lives.  They are rugged individualists
who are happy to make their own way in the world and have little interest in helping
those who are not so well equipped to advance their own well-being.  Game players
don’t hold values or world views that would justify the existence of a tax system
except of the most basic kind.  Their idea of tax reform involves the constriction of
the system, a flat rate of tax, no deductions and so on.
The effects of increasing deterrence and closing off options for game playing
therefore need to be interpreted against this backdrop.  Understanding these
background variables may explain why some people have argued that game playing is
never ending (McBarnet and Whelan, 1999); as soon as one loophole is closed,
another is identified so that tax officer and tax avoider become engaged in a game of
cat and mouse.
Table 6     Mean scores and significant differences on social values and world
views for the game playing group and the never group
Group
Social values and world
views
Game
playing
N = 158
Never
N = 849
t-value
Values social and economic
status
4.86 4.39 5.86**
Values competence and
effectiveness
5.67 5.47 2.91*
Wants small government and
free markets
3.32 3.09 3.28**
Supports tax reform that
brings containment and
efficiency
3.98 3.81 2.98*
Supports tax reform that
simplifies the system -
removes deduction and
exemption
3.22 2.96 3.18*
Wants to pay less tax and
happy to get less from
government
3.13 2.91 2.95*
*  p < .01   **  p < .001
Conclusion
The attitude of game playing appears to be a coherent style of engagement with the
tax authority in that it is related to behaviour, it is supported by sympathetic
professionals, it is legitimated through perceptions of a “sleepy” system, and
buttressed by opposition to the tax system.  Probably the most interesting aspect of
game playing is that it is fundamentally adversarial in terms of objectives, with signs
of neither victimization nor procedural unfairness.  It seems to be socially constructed
as a competitive game, almost as a game between friendly rivals - the tax officer on
one side, the taxpayer on the other.  As the game extends to include more and more
Australians, however, one wonders how the rules of the game will come to be
understood by newcomers.  And if the rules are clarified, questions need to be asked
about the consequences.  Does this mean there will be ratcheting up of the contest
between taxpayer and tax administrator?  Through putting everyone on their mettle,
will the game intensify, with more and more action in the courts?  How this game
plays out will depend on the responsiveness of both parties.  One thing of which we
can be sure is that neither side lacks the capacity and resources to play on the world’s
centre courts.  As we observe the responses of each side, the question we might well
ask as this cat and mouse game unfolds is: Who is the cat and who is the mouse?
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